3. FINDINGS

1. HFEO #1 had never trained on nor operated this type of bulldozer.

2. HFEO #1 was unfamiliar with operations in this terrain and soil type.

3. HFEO #1 was aggressive in his desire to extricate his partner’s dozer (D4645).

4. HFEO #1 was not wearing a safety helmet.

5. HFEOs #1 and #2 were partners at the Hollister Air Attack Base and had a strong bond between them.

6. HFEO #2 had not gotten his dozer “stuck” in the 3 ½ years that he had worked for CAL FIRE and had extricated HFEO #1’s dozer before.

7. HFEO #1 was making light of the fact that now he was going to get to return the favor (extricate HFEO #2 Dozer).

8. HFEO #1 was known for going “all out” all the time.

9. HFEO #2 was standing behind and watching HFEO #1 construct the bench.

10. Dozer 4641 was equipped with only a single lap-belt.

11. HFEO #2 did not have portable radio communications (handie-talkie).

12. The coroner report showed the cause of death was a single violent impact to the head, causing blunt force trauma; the source most likely being a heavy metal object.

13. Evidence shows that HFEO #1’s head made impact with the side of the dozer’s brush guard.

14. Evidence indicates the blow to the head penetrated approximately two inches into HFEO #1’s skull.

15. Weather conditions and visibility were not relevant to the cause of the accident.

16. Slope at and below the accident site ranged from 83 percent to 94 percent.

17. Soil was coarse textured and loamy sands (Cieneba Soil) that lack cohesion and are difficult to compact as stable fill on steep slopes.
18. HFEO #2 was uncomfortable being on his dozer as it sat immobile on the steep slope.

19. Unconventional division identifiers “A”, “M”, and “S” were utilized.

20. It is unclear where the geographical break was located between Division M and Division S on the incident.

21. No incident overhead (Incident Commander, Operations Section Chief, or Division Supervisor) had observed or scouted the segment on Division S where D4645 was stuck.

22. No incident overhead (Incident Commander, Operations Section Chief or Division Supervisor) was fully aware of the location or status of D4641 and D4645.

23. No incident overhead (Incident Commander, Operations Section Chief, or Division Supervisor) had visual contact with D4641 or D4645 during their attempt to extricate D4645.

24. HFEO #1 was operating D4641, a 2005 Caterpillar D6N-XL equipped with differential steering, tiller-bar and “joy stick” style control, six-way angle blade, and high tracks. HFEO #1 was normally assigned to operate D4645, a 1964 Caterpillar D6C equipped with a three-speed power shift transmission and standard steering clutches, foot controlled brakes, straight blade, and flat tracks.